what it means to suffer discrimination in the enjoyment of the right to privacy, which must draw from an appreciation of the difference between enjoying the right to privacy, as protected by Article 14, and being entitled to the specific protections, as against the state, provided for in Article 8. I seek in this article to begin the process of constructing that understanding.
The first section below introduces the problem of the ambit, outlining and illustrating four conceptions of the ambit, the fourth of which is my own proposed new conception. The second section lays down a foundation of principles to guide the application of Article 14. The next three sections employ these principles to critically evaluate the first three conceptions, explaining how and why they fail to give effect to the apparent aims of Article 14 and demonstrating their inconsistency with the weight of Strasbourg precedent. The article concludes by explaining and defending a proposed fourth conception of the ambit that is true to the aims of Article 14 and the HRA, and consistent with both Strasbourg learning and a UK conception of the rights set out in the Convention.
THE AMBIT, THE UK JUDICIARY, AND THE FOUR CONCEPTIONS
The text of Article 14 does not provide clear instructions for a judiciary accustomed, before the HRA, to judicial review and the application anti-discrimination statutes:
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.
Nothing in the language of Article 14 unambiguously directs the focus of the judicial inquiry, leaving courts to decide several questions whose answers can radically change the outcomes of cases. What does it mean to "enjoy" rights and freedoms? What is discrimination? Are we concerned with identifying state action that has the quality of being "discriminatory", or are we concerned with experiences of state action that affect people as "discrimination"? It should not be surprising if UK judges have tended to answer such questions in ways that make Article 14 feel more like the statutory discrimination or judicial review cases more familiar to them.
Of course, domestic courts have not been called upon to answer these questions entirely without guidance. First, the ECtHR has made it clear that the area described by "the enjoyment of Convention rights" is not the same as the area directly protected by other Convention articles. Strasbourg has recognised that it would render Article 14 superfluous and absurd to hold that it could only prohibit unequal treatment with regard to matters already guaranteed against state encroachment by other articles. Therefore, Article 14 has been found to prohibit, for example, the discriminatory provision of benefits related to family life, even if Article 8 would not by itself require the granting of such benefits as a matter of the core protection of the right to family life: if the state chooses to promote a Convention right beyond the requirements of the ECHR, Article 14 requires that it do so equally. 8 A great deal of disagreement remains as to how far the area of "enjoyment" exceeds the protective scope of the other Convention articles-
indeed that is what the entire ambit question is about-but there is no question that it does.
Second, Strasbourg precedent has clarified that discrimination means "unjustified discrimination", which in turn means the use of a distinction that either does not pursue a legitimate aim, or does not satisfy "proportionality," in that it produces discriminatory effects disproportionate to the advancement of that aim secured by the measure. 9 This means that the Article 14 analysis, once engaged, involves a step in which the court may take account of issues such as whether the state intended to discriminate, or to affect Convention rights, and must determine whether these considerations can justify any 8 demonstrated burden on a claimant"s equal enjoyment of Convention rights. The courts need not, therefore, constrict the ambit in order to screen out cases where the state acted "innocently", and to do so short-circuits an important step in the discrimination analysis.
Abdulaziz v United Kingdom [1985] ECHR 7, para 82; R (Carson) v Secretary for Work and Pensions
Finally, section 6 HRA makes it "unlawful for a [court] to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right," without express authority from Parliament; section 3(1) goes further to require judges "[s]o far as it is possible to do so" to read and "give effect" to legislation in a way compatible with Convention rights. This tells the UK intended to achieve. Such an analysis leads to a fourth approach, which is the one that I
propose and defend in this piece: the ambit is the area in which a person can be said to be "enjoying" another Convention right; the boundaries of this area must be drawn only by reference to an ordinary understanding, in the relevant society, of when a person can be said to be enjoying, for example, privacy, liberty, or free expression, and without reference to the core of those rights as protected against state encroachment by the relevant Convention articles; and the facts of a case enter into the ambit any time a state decision or measure directly or indirectly, intentionally, accidentally, or even unforeseeably has the effect of impairing the ability of an individual or group to enjoy the right in question on a basis of equality with the rest of society. It must be kept in mind that satisfying this relatively expansive test would merely allow Article 14 to apply to a given case, and would not compel a finding of discrimination or preclude a decision that the state action was justified.
The next section lays a foundation for assessing the four conceptions set out above, by teasing out the principles for interpretation and application of Article 14 that emerge from its text and from Strasbourg case law. The sections thereafter will evaluate each conception in turn.
FOUNDATION PRINCIPLES FOR THE AMBIT
Article 14 seeks equality above the line of core protection should turn on whether the extent to which an individual can enjoy a Convention right on a basis of equality with the rest of society has been impaired, inadvertently or otherwise, by a government measure or decision.
13
This formulation of course begs the question of what it means to "enjoy" a Convention right. Article 14 facially furnishes no support for limiting the scope of "the enjoyment of the right set out in Article A" by reference to the extent of protection afforded by Article A. Indeed, the very fact that we draw a line representing the limit of protection afforded by a given article suggests that there is an area below that line where we are not enjoying the right in question, and it is therefore "violated", and an area above the line where it is not violated and we can be said to be "enjoying" it. Thus the outer boundary of the area of enjoyment of Convention rights has no necessary relationship with the "protective scope" boundary.
The temptation to tie the ambit to the areas protected by other Convention articles comes in part from the facile assumption that the only effects of the ECHR and the HRA on the enjoyment of rights must flow from the line-drawing exercise in which the courts engage. The fact that the UK honours the rights set out in the Convention means that concerns about, say, family life, freedom of expression, or liberty are taken into account 12 See, eg, the International Labour Organisation"s anti-discrimination provision, Convention 111 (stripped of labour-specific language).
13 This refers only to what Robert Wintemute calls the "opportunity" route into Article 14, as opposed to the "ground" route. Wintemute, n 8 above, 370-371. in the development of policy, in the enactment of legislation, in the state"s executive decisions, and through "mainstreaming" ECHR rights into public debate. 14 It is only when the courts get involved-when the other effects of respect for Convention rights fail to prevent the state from appearing to encroach too far into the area of, for example, privacy-that a line must be drawn representing the protected core of the right of privacy.
When a court draws this line, and in so doing identifies the prima facie scope of protection afforded by Article 8(1), it is identifying only one part of the substance and meaning of the privacy right set out in the Convention. In other words, the prima facie coverage of Article 8 does not define the domestic conception of the right to privacy.
Instead, it describes the area of privacy into which the state may not venture without being called upon, under the ECHR, to justify its actions. This is a singular inquiry which, because it is necessitated by a claim that the state has gone too far, must define the core of the right by reference to the kinds of activities that should be secure from government intrusion.
The courts must appreciate that this conception of privacy is fit only for the purpose that gave rise to it, and not for other purposes. Article 14 cannot have been intended to allow the state to introduce measures that create inequalities in the area of ordinary privacy, freedom of religion, or liberty, simply because the protective core of Articles 8, 9, or 5 would not, theoretically, prevent the state from eliminating that area altogether in a non-discriminatory way. The protective conception is merely the core of the ordinary conception: the part any state must always justify invading. Therefore, there is no reason to define the ambit of a Convention right by reference, in any way, to the protective scope of the relevant article, because the latter is, in fact, a subset of the former, tightly circumscribed for reasons relating to the prerogatives of the state. The protective scope is derivative of the area of enjoyment of rights-not the other way around-so protective scope logic with its focus on state prerogatives has no place whatsoever in defining the contours of the ambit.
Justification is the place for state prerogatives and 'protective scope' logic
If it seems that the aims of the state should, in some way, influence the application of Article 14, this is not the business of the ambit. Strasbourg jurisprudence has provided an analytical step, justification, where the prerogatives of the state can weigh in the analysis, but only proportionally. The ECtHR, in Belgian Linguistics, read the word "discrimination" in the article to mean "unjustified discrimination". 24 This interpretation means that a state distinction that affects the equal enjoyment of Convention rights is unlawful discrimination unless justified. 25 To justify prima facie discrimination the state must demonstrate that its measure does not produce discriminatory effects disproportionate to the advancement of government interests secured by the measure.
26
Every regulatory distinction that comes within the ambit must satisfy proportionality:
A difference of treatment in the exercise of a right laid down in the Convention clearly established that there is no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realized.
27
Here, then, is the natural analytical step by which courts can redeem government actions which, although they appear to leave an individual or group with a diminished enjoyment of a Convention right, do not pursue or perpetuate invidious bias, or have minimal impacts compared with the benefits achieved.
There is no reason to fear letting the disposition of most Article 14 cases turn on whether the state can justify its measure in light of the requirements of proportionality.
Proportionality justification is a fundamental part of how Article 14 identifies what is and
is not "unlawful discrimination." The fact that the state has used a distinction-has "discriminated" in the generic sense-that burdens the equal enjoyment of a Convention right does not mean that any human right has been invaded at all. It is only where the unequal burden fails to satisfy a proportionality review that we say Article 14 discrimination has occurred. 28 Thus it is neither necessary nor appropriate to use a narrowed ambit to save the state"s blushes.
Moreover, the HRA appears to encourage the UK judiciary to analyse ECHR claims in a way that emphasizes the effects of measures on individuals, rather than the aims of those measures. It is well acknowledged that one of the purposes of the HRA is to call to account state actors for any impairment of Convention rights, intentional or 27 (1968) was bound to "secure without discrimination." As a result, what would generally be referred to as "the ambit of Article 9" was found to include activities not protected by Article 9 or any other article (seeking, as opposed to keeping, a particular job); state aims and methods not impugned by any Convention article (criminal convictions for conscientious objection, excluding criminals from professions to protect the public); and a burden connected to the practice of religion, as protected by Article 9, only in the most tenuous and indirect way, and apparently suffered only by a class of one.
What the Thlimmenos decision shows is that it makes no sense to talk about the ambit of Article 9 as a function of the protections afforded by Article 9. Article 9 does not require the state to guarantee, or justify the absence of, access to a particular occupation on the ground of religion; nor did it matter to the Court in Thlimmenos whether Article 9 requires the state to justify criminalising conscientious objection.
38
Similarly, the measure challenged in the case in no way encroached on any of the aspects of the practice of religion directly protected by Article 9. 39 How then can one derive the ambit recognised in Thlimmenos from Article 9? The answer provided by Thlimmenos is that one need not and should not try: one should derive the ambit from Article 14.
According to the ECtHR in Thlimmenos, a person "enjoys" the right set out in Article 9
without discrimination by arranging his or her life, private and public, according to his or her religious beliefs, without suffering burdens not imposed on other groups in the same society: the ordinary freedom of religion. 
AGAINST CONCEPTION (2): STATE AIMS SHOULD WEIGH ONLY PROPORTIONALLY
The second conception essentially amounts to a requirement that the state must have intended to enter into the ambit in order to be found to have done so. This conception draws some legitimacy from the argument that, at least with regard to primary legislation, entitled not to assist people in activities with which it could be required not to interferein order to dispose of a claim. It has done so without assessing whether the use of a regulatory approach that makes suicide impossible for the severely disabled, but not for others, produces benefits in proportion to the burden placed thereby on the severely disabled.
Even if the court-and this is usually not the case-took proportionality into account in deciding the initial question of whether Article 8(1) could reach a ban on assisted suicide, it did not subject to a proportionality review the use of a scheme that distinguished on the basis of disability: it merely assessed whether a presumptively nondiscriminatory prohibition on the use of assistance in suicide sufficiently advanced a legitimate state objective. Article 14, however, asks whether sufficient benefits flow from the choice to use a discriminatory measure-as opposed to a measure that avoids the discriminatory impacts complained of-to justify the discriminatory effects of that choice. 56 Reasonable minds might differ as to whether it serves any legitimate state aim at all to, in effect, forbid a tiny, vulnerable minority from choosing a fate that is perfectly legal for the rest of UK society; but no dispute can exist as to the following fact: the House of Lords in Pretty never weighed the proportionality of discrimination against the disabled when it made its ruling on the Article 14 ambit of Article 8.
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The UK judiciary has nevertheless openly adopted this mens rea requirement in several cases. In R (Douglas) v North Tyneside MBC, for example, the court concluded that the ambit of Article 2 of Protocol 1, which guarantees that the right to education "shall not be denied," was not entered by age-restricted student loans. This conclusion relied on the observation that the restrictions were not "aimed" at education, nor did they "necessarily" affect the claimant"s ability to get an education. The court in Douglas essentially imported, into the ambit analysis, information more suited to an inquiry into whether a discriminatory measure is "justified": the state might properly defend a measure that discriminates on the basis of age in the provision of student loans on the ground that the measure pursues aims independent of education, and that negative impacts of the scheme are both rare and avoidable. It is the very existence of this justification step in the Article 14 analysis that makes it invidious to factor such Another example of this phenomenon appears in X v Y, where the judges focused on whether the reason identified by the employer for its decision to dismiss the claimant entered into the ambit, rather than on whether the claimant"s burdened activity fell within the ambit. 64 The case involved the question of whether dismissal of an employee for receiving a police citation for engaging in a homosexual act in a public toilet was inconsistent with Article 14 taken together with Article 8. The Court of Appeal held that Article 8 could not possibly extend protection to acts in public places, so the ambit of Article 8 was not entered into by dismissal for such acts. This ignored the fact, however, that the employee would not have been cited, or dismissed, or even, probably, in a public toilet at all had he not made the private choice to engage in homosexual acts as opposed to heterosexual ones. The question for the court was whether the unfair dismissal lawswhich on their own would have endorsed the employer"s dismissal decision-as applied in this case imposed an unequal burden on the claimant"s right to make private choices as compared to heterosexuals. The claimant"s freedom to make choices as to his sexual orientation was in fact constrained by the tribunal essentially authorising his dismissal under circumstances where a heterosexual person would not be dismissed. The court did not, however, consider whether these facts entered into the ambit of Article 8. Instead, it decided that the relevant facts-the facts that must enter the ambit of Article 8 in order to engage Article 14-were the reasons of the employer for dismissing the employee.
It is clear that under the HRA, a court applying a Convention right must ask whether an individual"s right has been burdened, regardless of whether the challenged measure aimed at that right per se. Banning foxhunting clearly has effects on activities involving the enjoyment of privacy and family life as ordinarily understood; sacking gay employees for police entanglements that would never happen to heterosexual employees clearly imposes unequal consequences on private choices. That the government or the employer did not intend to affect these activities; that these effects would not materialise for most people; that the challenged action only interfered with some but not all such activities; and that the claimants could avoid some of the negative effects of the challenged action, are all arguments that should have been directed to justification: a proper justification analysis would very likely find the foxhunting ban proportionate, and might find the dismissal proportionate. But that is not what the judges did. They held that if the challenged action aimed at something that did not engage Article 8 protection, Article 14 could not ward off "collateral damage" to other protected activities.
AGAINST CONCEPTION (3): PROTECTIVE SCOPE LOGIC TAINTS THE AMBIT
The third conception is perhaps the most common. It is adopted by courts and commentators who acknowledge that Strasbourg precedent requires an ambit that extends beyond the prima facie reach of other articles, but who cannot avoid the fundamental mistake of the first conception-that of treating Article 14 as a gloss on other articles instead of a guarantee in its own right. Courts commonly address claims under Article 14-coupled, of course, with another non-parasitic "substantive" article-by deriving the ambit of the substantive right from an antecedent interpretation of that article"s protective reach. Domestic judges typically ask first whether the challenged measure offends the substantive article, and only if it does not do they move to consider the Article 14 claim.
This method leads the courts astray because they nearly always take the thinking involved in deciding whether, for instance, Article 8 forbids the state to take a certain action, and apply that thinking to the question of whether the action affected the claimant"s enjoyment of the right set out in Article 8.
I have already argued that the protective core of a Convention right is derivative of the area of its enjoyment, and that therefore the boundaries of that protective core can shed no light on where courts should draw the boundaries of the ambit. Protocol 12 into effect. Similarly, a broad ambit, that would permit more complaints to satisfy the ambit inquiry, should not fall to a "floodgates" objection because, as I argued above, the justification analysis is the appropriate mechanism for separating lawful and unlawful government distinctions. The bench and bar might find the ambit a more convenient tool for weeding out weak cases, in that they can more easily cast it as a purely legal-as opposed to factual-determination, but such a consideration cannot justify using a conception of the ambit that weeds out the strong cases along with the weak.
Any conception a court adopts for the scope of Article 14 requires deciding issues such as whether privacy encompasses the choice to die, 79 or whether sexual choices are private when implemented in public places. 80 Drawing lines is difficult, and the only conceptions that might make this job easier-requiring regulatory mens rea or identifying the ambit with the prima facie scope of other articles-are demonstrably wrong and distorting. There might, however, exist an approach that would keep the ambit broad, but less impressionistic. It has been suggested, for example, that the ambit "is not simply a case of "you will know it when you see it," but that in fact the sort of subject matter that we are dealing with is also informed by other international instruments. unfortunately begs the question of whether Article 14 seeks to prevent discrimination only in an area defined by an international consensus on privacy or other Convention rights.
In one sense, there already exists an authoritative international consensus on privacy, relevant to the states signatory to the ECHR, represented by Article 8 and the body of precedent related to its application. As I have argued, the protective scope of Article 8 cannot flesh out the privacy ambit because it is a subset of that ambit. In every ECHR state the experience of privacy is likely to be at its most idiosyncratic above the line of Article 8"s protective scope. It is here that cultural identity will find expression; it is here that one nation might more assiduously scrutinise, for example, the sexual orientation of putative adoptive parents 82 or the use of fingerprint or DNA records. 83 It is precisely in this area, where the ECtHR refuses to claim that a consensus exists, that Article 14 must prevent the enjoyment of rights from being secured more zealously for some than for others. Article 14 serves its most important function where the majoritythe authors of any view of a right that would be characteristic of a particular nationarranges things, in the area above direct protection from other Convention rights, in such a way that the greatest enjoyment of the right comes from integration, assimilation, or simple agreement with the majority.
It is difficult to imagine a set of international principles that would assist a UK court with the question of whether, for example, access to student loans for university study is part of the enjoyment of the right to education in the UK. 
